Editor’s note: As Western Group Therapists with no skin in the game will continue to spin tales of 5D glory, Russians who have an actual stake in the events have no such luxury. Below is an example of how the Russian media (PolitNavigator) is commenting on the offensive (and a fantastic article it is).

On what has been “accomplished”:

In six months, Ukraine has become much more militarized, much more angry and closer to NATO, and the degree of nationalism and Russophobic hysteria is much higher. At the same time, Donbass has turned into an arena of fierce hostilities and shelling, which has increased tenfold, with no clear prospect of their completion, becoming much less protected and safe than before February 24.

On who was right all along:

It turns out that retired Strelkov, who was excommunicated from the Ukrainian theater of operations, or civilian military correspondents with volunteers foresaw in advance what the active generals involved in the operation did not see point-blank? And if they saw it and didn’t prepare, then the potential assessment of the professional suitability of the military command will be even less biased.

On the “clarity” of Russian goals and mission:

It should be noted the main political weakness and vulnerability of the SMO. It is that until now, six months after the start of hostilities, it is not at all clear what the Russian soldiers are fighting for in Ukraine, what they are doing there at all, and what result they want to achieve in the end.

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Source: PolitNavigator

Machine translated from Russian 

“The Offensive of the AFU. It’s Time to Tell the Ugly Truth”

The result of the three-day mini-blitzkrieg of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kharkov region was a sharp change in the configuration of the front in this sector – the territories controlled by the Russians shrank by two-thirds, the main cities were lost, and the Ukrainian troops now directly threaten the recently liberated territory of the LPR , with great difficulty, from the northern settlements of which ( Svatovo) is already a mass evacuation of the population.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine also took to the approaches to the recaptured Krasny Liman in the DPR a couple of months ago, threatening to nullify almost all the achievements of the summer operation in the Donbass and put an end to plans to take Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.

The reaction of the Russian military headquarters turned out to be predictable: in a belated and already published post factum and essentially useless (everyone who was in the subject had already made their conclusions by that time ), the incident was called “an operation to curtail and organize the transfer of the Izyumsko-Balakleya grouping of troops on the territory of the Donetsk People’s Republic, during which a number of distraction and demonstration activities were carried out with the designation of the real actions of the troops.“

All this, according to officialdom, was done (I quote) “to achieve the stated goals of a special military operation to liberate Donbass.” In general, as in a well-known joke: not leaving the lines, but retreating to pre-prepared positions. Well, at least not a goodwill gesture, thanks for that too.

_{Nevertheless, the defeat in the Kharkov region (and this is precisely the defeat, no matter what anyone says) leaves behind a number of questions and gives grounds for some generalizations.}

First of all, the very fact that the Russian military group turned out to be unprepared for such a development of events, and the defense crumbled in a matter of days, tells us about the presence of serious problems at the level of planning the operation itself, about the absence of any feedback between the military command at all levels and the expert community.

The fact that there would be a Ukrainian counter-offensive was talked about all summer by almost everyone – only the lazy did not unsubscribe on this topic. And the fact that in the end what happened was a surprise and caught by surprise speaks of the deplorable state of military planning and staff analytics.

_{It turns out that retired Strelkov, who was excommunicated from the Ukrainian theater of operations, or civilian military correspondents with volunteers foresaw in advance what the active generals involved in the operation did not see point-blank? And if they saw it and didn’t prepare, then the potential assessment of the professional suitability of the military command will be even less biased.}

However, let experts comment on purely military materiel, but we will focus on what has already been said and move on to the political part.

From a political point of view, everything is more than bad. The Ukrainians not only successfully passed their conditional “pitching” on the expediency of further weapons, but, therefore, the supply of more and more advanced Western “iron” will continue on the rise, and countering this “iron” will eat up more and more efforts and resources from the Russian side.

It is much more important that an important psychological barrier has been overcome in the minds of both the Ukrainian military and their rear support group: the enemy has once again become convinced that there is no point in negotiating, the Russians can be successfully beaten, the main thing is to try hard.

And this, of course, does nothing to facilitate negotiations and end the war on Russian terms. On the contrary, it motivates Ukrainians not to seek negotiations, to put pressure on them, taking what is theirs on the battlefield. By the way, this is exactly what the Kiev Reznikovs, Arestovichi and Podolyaks have been saying in recent months – that it is possible to talk with Russia only by significantly improving the Ukrainian negotiating position.

The unpleasant news for Russia here is that appetite comes with eating, and if the Armed Forces of Ukraine are so lucky, then the Kiev authorities are unlikely to give up the temptation to press the trigger all the way – in order to break the whole bank, since luck itself floats into their hands. So it is not at all a fact that Ukraine will be satisfied with the current improvement in its negotiating positions and will go into negotiations.

_{Another bad news is that the reputational myth of the Russian army has been nullified. In conditions when the Russians, against their will, leave Balakleya, Izyum and Kupyansk, talking about the victorious prospects for a campaign against Lvov or about the NWO in Latvia is somehow “not that”. However, there is such a breed of talkers-propagandists who will not be shamed by the eyes. The only good thing is that this unpleasant truth has come to light now, in the course of a clash with the Ukrainian proxies of NATO, and not in the course of a possible direct clash with the military machine of the alliance, which the Russian army in its current state and under the current command, I fear, simply will not survive.}

It is possible to restore the reputation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – if there is a desire. Only the process is long, and most importantly, the public no longer believes the words, PR reports about successfully conducted exercises and the like. Strength will have to be confirmed by serious successes on the ground – in the course of real hostilities.

_{In fact, each new success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine makes the prospect of any peace negotiations with Ukraine more and more elusive. Leaving only one format for such negotiations – the surrender of Russia. Moreover, it is not a fact that there are no people in Moscow willing to sign it. Provided, of course, that everything will be arranged nicely and gradually – so as not to upset the Russians right away.}

_{This, of course, is pure conjecture and author’s speculation, however, if in the coming weeks we do not see any organizational conclusions on the Kharkov region; if after a while, when society digests the abandonment of the Kharkov region, the turn of the Kherson region or the already liberated regions of the Luhansk region will come according to the same scheme; if by the end of autumn the promised referendums are not held at least in the LPR and DPR, and instead their territory will decrease; if all those involved in the disgrace near Izyum and Balakleya retain their positions and posts, and the political class continues to pretend that nothing special is happening; if, finally, there is no radical change in the paradigm of conducting the SMO, this will become a powerful help for suspicions that the special operation is being quietly poured out. Like that frog that is boiled over low heat so that it does not suspect something was wrong ahead of time.}

In the meantime, it’s time to voice the unpleasant truth to many. Today, the SMO is closer than ever to failure. Moreover, regardless of whether it will be possible to stop the further advance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and preserve at least part of the achievements of the spring-summer campaign, or whether the hostilities will again return to the starting point and will have to re-defend the already liberated cities in Donbas, rolling back to the demarcation line on February 24.

_{Again, without going into purely military-tactical issues (for this – turn to Strelkov and other military experts), it should be noted the main political weakness and vulnerability of the SMO. It is that until now, six months after the start of hostilities, it is not at all clear what the Russian soldiers are fighting for in Ukraine, what they are doing there at all, and what result they want to achieve in the end.}

If you believe the top political leadership of the Russian Federation, there is no reason to panic, just as there is no reason to strain: everything is on track, the SMO is moving according to plan, it will be completed on time, and its goals and objectives will be achieved.

And in this sense, oddly enough, everything is so. They can stop the SMOin Moscow at any convenient moment, declaring what has actually been achieved as originally planned.

About what goals Russia has achieved and what tasks have been completed, we will also learn after the fact – exactly at the moment when we are informed about their successful implementation and achievement. And as for “on time”, no one called specific dates. Right? Right.

“All our actions are aimed at helping those who live in the Donbass. Go to the Donbass and ask the Ukrainians who live there – what values ​​do they protect there?”, – these are, if anything, the words of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who quite clearly and without equivocation outlined the scope of the tasks of the NWO at the recent WEF in Vladivostok.

_{So, one should not be too surprised if, as a result, it turns out that no one in Moscow planned to join anything other than the LPR and the DPR. This is if Kiev nevertheless shows goodwill and decides not to recapture the Donbass by military means. Which is not a fact, given the mood of the Ukrainian society and the lack of at least some arguments on the Russian side in favor of convincing Kiev that a campaign against the Donbass is expensive and useless.}

Speaking about the goals and objectives of the SMO, one can also change optics, stop fantasizing about the topics of “liquidation of Ukraine”, “reunification of Russian lands” and the like, but simply ask one single question: in the six months since the start of the special operation, Russia has become closer or further from those originally voiced goals?

In any area, be it the protection of Donbass from shelling, demilitarization, or denazification or recognition of Crimea and the independence of the LDNR, a neutral status or preventing the transformation of Ukrainian territory into an appendage of NATO. I don’t know about you, but personally the answer is obvious to me: compared to the end of February, in all of the above parameters, there is not progress, but a significant regression.

_{In six months, Ukraine has become much more militarized, much more angry and closer to NATO, and the degree of nationalism and Russophobic hysteria is much higher. At the same time, Donbass has turned into an arena of fierce hostilities and shelling, which has increased tenfold, with no clear prospect of their completion, becoming much less protected and safe than before February 24.}

At a minimum, this is an occasion to think about what Russia is doing wrong and to change something in the existing score. Because instead of returning Ukraine, the Russians are losing it more and more every month.