Surkov: It Is High Time Russia Reverses the Obscene Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918

"We are for peace. Certainly. But not for the obscene one. For the right one."

“So you still have to remember the bad. After all, the abyss is no less impressive part of the landscape than the heights. “

Surkov is erstwhile Putin’s adviser. (As recently as 2020.)

Machine translated from Russian.

Today, the word “geopolitics” is used mainly to explain troubles on exchanges and exchangers. And it would not be harmful to recall its original meaning.

In those distant times, when geopolitics still hoped to become a science, it managed to give some banalities an almost academic shine, which still allows them to be used both to create ideological constructions and for military-strategic divination.

One of these platitudes states that landscape determines the character of states. Features of the development of the people and its aspirations depend on the properties of the area in which it was formed. The inhabitants of the plains are different from the highlanders. Maritime powers from continental powers. A nation born in the Wild Field is not like a nation born in the Teutoburg Forest or on the banks of the Yellow River.

The second platitude is that the size of the territory matters. Control of space is the basis of survival. It is now often heard that this is an archaic view of politics. That the struggle for the earth, sea and heaven is no longer worth waging, because… it’s not clear why, though. Most likely, because of laziness and fear.

Of course, the idea of landscape and territory in our days is significantly complicated. Everywhere there are diverse, previously unseen and little explored virtual landscapes of cyberspace. And the study of neighboring planets tells restless superpowers that it is possible to grow not only in different directions, but also upwards, into space – already called in NATO’s program documents “an increasingly contested, overloaded and competitive space.”

There is also a deepening understanding of how much the psychological landscape, the mythical environment surrounding them, and the influence of collective historical memory affect the behavior of peoples.

The mnemological space of any ambitious nation is extremely heterogeneous, contrasting. Formed by victories and defeats, it consists of hills and lowlands, peaks and dips. Victories are remembered willingly, celebrated and projected to tomorrow. Eras of shame are rarely discussed and in low tones, or even completely hushed up.

Attempts to remember only the good and forget about the bad are quite natural (this is the law of psychology) and quite futile (this is the law of psychology). Accumulating, the positive and negative experience of the people is connected into a single complex that affects the collective consciousness and behavior. At the same time, each nation is complex with its own, unique and indivisible complexity.

So you still have to remember the bad. After all, the abyss is no less impressive part of the landscape than the heights. And no less than by triumphs are people motivated by humiliation and trauma.

In February 1918, a historic (and partly hysterical) meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party was held. It approved the decision to conclude peace with Germany. This peace, known as Brest, received in advance in the opposition press (there was still one at that time) an additional and clearer name – shameful.

And indeed, the world turned out to be downright offensive. Under its terms, Russia renounced the vast territories of the Baltic States, Belarus, and Ukraine that previously belonged to it. The western border rolled far to the east, pushing the country into the pre-Petrine, one might even say, pre-Romanov times. There’s nowhere nastier.

The humiliating “treaty” was, ironically, canceled not by Russia, but by its former (abandoned) allies. In the same year of 1918. After that, the Soviet Republic and then the Soviet Union gradually regained the lost lands. Apparently.

But geopolitical processes are slow, their results do not immediately appear from under the heaps of stunning events. The disintegration of Russia, which began in the 17-18 years of the last century and seems to have been stopped by the communist state at the cost of colossal sacrifices, has not really stopped. The great mighty Soviet Union turned out to be not a fortress, but something like a Chernobyl sarcophagus, inside which reactions of division, decomposition and alienation continued.

As a result, if you compare the modern map of the European part of our country with the map approved by the notorious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it is unlikely that there will be many differences. 

Strikingly, the western border of today’s Russia almost literally coincides with the line of limitation to which the Bolsheviks cowardly agreed in 1918 after the presentation of the German ultimatum.

It turns out that russia after many years was again pushed back into the borders of the “shameful world”. Not losing the war. Not sick of the revolution. Some ridiculous perestroika, some murky glasnost was enough for the patchwork Soviet empire to come apart at the seams. So, a fatal vulnerability was built into the system.

So what’s next? Definitely not silence. There’s a lot of geopolitics ahead. Practical and applied. And even, possibly, contact.

How could it be otherwise, if it’s cramped and boring and awkward… and it is inconceivable for Russia to remain within the boundaries of a shameful world.

We are for peace. Certainly. But not for the obscene. For the right one.

Source: Aktualnye Kommentarii

  1. Hostage (Raptar) Driver says

    Remember the bad.
    This is why Serbs celebrate 1389.
    Even though we won the battle we lost the war.

  2. EstibenDelMar says

    Wait there…the author is missing something even more important than the bolshevikes giving up russina teritories. Lenin and friends did also paid “war restitutions” to the germans, sending them fuel, steel, iron, lumber, gold, food, hides and several other resources and inputs so the germans could keep fighting against the europeans.

    Lenin and his gangster friends were expecting that germany and the other european countries kept bleeding until they got so weak that they wouldnt be able to resist an invasion by the red army.

    In the early 1920’s, they commanded the head of the red army to make war plans to invade poland and germany but the red army was defeated in poland and the ongoing russian civil war, prevented the red army to keep going west.

    This dream of the bolshevikes of invading Europe had to wait until 1940’s when Stalin was almost ready to conquer Europe but was prevented by the germans.

    1. Hostage (Raptar) Driver says

      Complete nonsense, I’m sick of this revisionism.

      1. TZVI says

        No doubt the Communists acceded to Germany in WWI. They tried, but failed to take Poland in the 1920.

        Here is the Polish version of it:,The-Polish-Soviet-War-of-1920.html

        The Soviets ( re)took 1/2 of Poland at the Start of WWII.

        While the Soviet/ Bolshevik / Communist mantra was to spread the revolution of Communism, by 1941 there is no indication they would have invaded Romania, Hungary, or the rest of Eastern Europe unless Germany acted first. It seems they learned their lesson from 1920. and some of the Communist revolutionary fever was reduced by practical ( more realistic) goals.

        There were plans to invade Germany however, (* the “May Plan”), and like many contingency planing papers…these plans were not implemented. In contrast the Germans invaded the USSR, despite diplomatic ruses including handwritten “love letters” from Hitler ( Schicklgruber) to Stalin.

        I know it’s Wiki, but it’s a pretty fair article:

        My take on it is the Soviets had not made up their mind to invade ( esp. Stalin), and some realized they were not as prepared to do so as others in the command chain thought.

        1. EstibenDelMar says

          Stalin was very ready! had the best tanks (t34, kv1, kv2), and while Hitler had aprox. 1500 fully functional (the rest were either outdated or not ready), Stalin had almost 22,000 tanks of different models. The same with planes, subs, ships, howitzers. Stalin had the best weapons, in quantities not imagined by the europeans and well trained troops. Had Germany waited 2 more months to attack Stalin, the whole Europe would had become communist.

          1. EstibenDelMar says

            Jean López; 1941 La guerre Absolute; Agosto 2019
            Sean McMeekin; Stalin’s Wars a new history of WW2; Abril 2021.

          2. TZVI says


            Know one thing. I don’t down vote…I reply. I respect both sides of this argument.

            Yes Stalin had certain quantities of better equipment…much of which was destroyed because it was positioned poorly right on the borders, and the attack took the Soviets by surprise. The Luftwaffe had air superiority in the first year, and that also made a difference. ( many Soviet planes were destroyed on the field in the initial attacks). The mass of new and often improved T-34 tanks had to be supplied during the war, many lend lease Jeeps, Studebaker and Ford Trucks ( Ford being used by both sides).



            My take from this is that 420,000 4 wheel drive trucks from western nations made the Soviet Counter attack possible. Just think, if the Soviets were lacking in Truck production capacity, could they really have invaded Germany in 1941?

            On the T-34:


            As you can see, while it’s a fact it was a better tank than the Panzer, it too had initial teething issues ( mostly mechanical breakdowns).

            900 T-34’s in 1941 would NOT have been enough to defeat Germany, not even before the panzerfuast was deployed in late 1943…Germany is not a tiny country, and Artillery, Mines, and just the distance would make a rush to Berlin with only (about) 1K T-34’s in 1941 pure folly. If I remember correctly it took over 30,000 active T-34’s in the final year of the war to take Germany.

            I do not consider most of the Soviet leaders / generals outside of Zhukov as anything close to Patton or Rommel, etc. they suffered from poor leadership in many areas. I think this is where the contingency “attack” plans against Germany suffer the most.

            The real question is would Stalin actually attack? Either in 2 months or two years, the answer to that questions is…yes there was a good chance he would have made a move on Germany (3rd Reich) as soon as he felt it was the best time to do so…most likely later than people think.

            Just as the British were happy to see Germany exhaust itself in Soviet lands, so to would Stalin love to have seen Nazi Germany exhaust itself with some other countries armies and lands.

            1. EstibenDelMar says

              I’m no expert i have just read a couple of books here and there but if you want some more info on this “What if Stalin attacked first?” question, you can read Mark Solonin’s website, or Victor Suvorov’s books “the icebreaker” and “The Main Culprit”. You can also look for Udo Walendy’s “Truth for Germany”, Joaquim Hoffman’s “Stalin war of extermination”. Also, Gerald Menuhim’s “Tell the Truth shame the devil”. Ron Unz’s website is full of articles about the this too.

            2. TZVI says

              The way I see it if the USSR had tried it, they would be bogged down in the first 500KM if they tried it in 1941.

              Neither the Battle of Stalingrad, nor Kursk would have happened ( the foolish German / Axis attack on 6 well defended Soviet lines -defense in depth) instead the tables would have been turned…and the late allied invasion of Normandy would have been delayed quite a while.

              Speaking of Kursk, if you look at the table of Tank loses, the Soviets had much higher loses overall, especially when they went on the offensive against the Wermacht:


              Imagine having such losses, but being even further from your supply lines.

              Of course this is all speculation…

              I have read some of the articles on UNZ website, they were quite informative, but lacking in the major details such as quantities of T-34’s available in 1941, let alone the quality issues in the first year.

              Essentially ( If I remember correctly) the premise that the Soviets were about to attack hinges on how all the airfields were right on the border…being part of a very poor Offensive-Defensive posture, it’s still impossible to know that the Soviets were slated to attack in 1941. From the near total surprise the Reich was able to achieve in the initial stages of Barbarossa I find this hard to believe.

            3. TZVI says

              Correction :”The way I see it if the USSR had tried it, they would be bogged down in the first 200KM if they tried it in 1941

      2. EstibenDelMar says

        Do you know what else was considered revisionism?? Katyn. If it wasnt for revisionism, people would still think the germans killed all those poles.

    2. Kefyros says

      Hitler understood he was double crossed by Stalin. The Soviets had prepared to invade Germany since 1937, when Tukhachevskydiscussed such a plan with his French counterpart, Gamelin. Before the Ribbentrop – Molotov pact, the Soviets were negotiating in parallel with the English and French to whom they submitted 5 alternative plans to invade Germany. But the “Allies” were not ready, so the Soviets turned to Germany, which was under pressure to avoid a 2-front war and forced to accept Stalin’s conditions. Nevertheless, the Communists never broke their ties to EN and FR. The best proof they remained in good terms is that UK and France never declared war on the USSR although USSR ALSO invaded Poland (and Finland and the Baltic States) so they were, following their logic, the bigger criminal.
      Besides, the Soviets demands were becoming more and more absurd, actually unacceptable from the German perspective. They wanted Romania, Bulgaria and the European part of Turkey, all the way to the Straits. Hitler made the right decision to invade USSR. His fatal mistake was not to go there as a liberator although he knew how badly the population suffered under the Communist rule.

      1. TZVI says

        Those plans were thrown into disarray when the French crumpled quicker than the Poles.

      2. EstibenDelMar says

        The fact is that Stalin / Communism was an imperialistic kant / ideology that seeked to liberate workers everywhere in the world. That is undeniable. Lenin and Stalin’s speeches often pointed out that freeing the oppressed workers was imperative for them. Another undeniable hint is the huge industrial – militar complex that Stalin developed since the second half of 1920s that allowed him to fully equip after having suffered such an attack by germany. And there are more documented hints that keep pointing at Stalin as one of the main culprits.

        It is important to note that Russia had been kidnapped by a gang of blood thirsty criminals led first by Lenin and later by Stalin, and none of them had been voted into power. Stalin later developed a burocratic /military system that allowed him to make true any wish he had with little or none opposition.

        Most of russians, under Stalin, were mere pawns in his big game. Critics were shot or sent to the goulags. I put emphasis on this point because the guilt of starting the Russian – German war doent fall on the russian people of that era and their current sons and daughters but solely on Stalin and his closests allies. Maybe even solely in Stalin himself.

        1. TZVI says

          No love for Godless Communism here. No love for Fascism either.

  3. N. Dubovitsky says

    We will come tomorrow. We will conquer or perish. There is no third way.

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