So Far Strelkov’s Pessimistic Predictions for Donbass Battle Are Holding Up 100%

"Ukrainian army managed to prevent the widely advertised breakthrough. Won another week to replenish troops, regroup and prepare reserves."

When a “pessimist” is right, he’s called a realist

Editor’s note: It has been a week of only the tiniest gains. Furthermore, the gains have come in the wrong area. Mostly the gains have been to the north of Seversky Donets river. Meanwhile, the Izyum bridgehead to the south of the river from which the thrust is supposed to develop has been static (contained).

Yea, we get it. It’s difficult to develop an offensive from such a smallish bridgehead. But let’s not lie that some great “progress” is being made here

These are facts apparent to anyone so the new copium is that Russia is supposedly killing 500 Ukrainians every day. Except there is no way that Russians would have access to this information, and if you believe that Rybar Telegram actually has access to Ukrainian documents you belong in a mental institution.

It’s the good ole Vietnam strategy I guess. When you can’t show any actual real progress on the ground resort to made-up body counts. Body counts don’t win wars, and besides Ukraine can replace its losses. Russia can not. Any men Ukraine losses will be replaced. Those lost by Russia will mostly not be.

Worse than a lie, it’s intelligence-insulting cringe

The outcome of the Donbass battle, in the sense that it will eventually be Russia-controlled is not in doubt, but so far Russia isn’t on track here for any fancy encirclement. On the contrary, it is on track to run out of steam after Donbass is taken.

Source: Igor Strelkov

Machine translated from Russian.

In the Kharkov area — there is fighting to the northeast and southwest of the city. The attacks of the Ukrainian troops in these areas were stopped without significant results fort them. Our troops, however, also have nothing to “boast” about. In general, the front remains on the line reached by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a slight advance a week ago.

In the area south of Izyum, over the past two days, Russian troops have not been able to make significant progress and capture any settlements. There is no talk yet about a breakthrough to the Barvenkovo-Slavyansk highway.

Fighting continued around Liman  — apparently considered by the command of the Russian Armed Forces as a “consolation prize” for the expected (by me) failure to cover the entire enemy Donetsk grouping.

The estuary is covered by Russian troops and units of the LDNR Armed Forces from the east and southeast, but now (that the threat of a breakthrough to Barvenkovo ​​has weakened) the Armed Forces of Ukraine are clearly not going to surrender it without a fight. [He’s saying the Ukrainians will nonetheless fight a delaying action in the holdout north of the river rather than evacuate immediately.] The wooded area around the town and the fully blossomed foliage on the vegetation contribute to the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The advance of Russian troops is slow. Both sides are suffering significant losses.

In the area of ​​Severodonetsk – no changes: again, because they do not intend to leave this heavily fortified outpost without a real threat to the rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and it is not possible to take it by storm. Fighting continues in the industrial zone on the southern outskirts of Rubizhne. There are heavy losses on both sides. [Together with Rubizhne and Lisichansk, Severodonetsk forms an urban agglomeration of 300,000 people. So far the Russians only hold Rubizhne and even that not entirely. That’s a large urban area and a good defensive position.]

Severodonetsk is at the very east of Ukrainian salient. It is exposed in theory yet Ukrainians feel no urgency to abandon it

Popasnaya — no change. Fierce street fighting with a very slow advance of Russian and allied troops.

Donetsk region. Avdiivka and Maryinka – no changes. District Ugledar – similarly. The only difference is that the DPR Armed Forces have not yet entered the city itself and the key settlements around it.

In the Zaporozhye region, units of the Donetsk Republic deployed there failed in preparing an offensive in the area of ​​​​the village of Lyubimovka (North of Melitopol along the highway to Zaporozhye, west of Tokmak). Positional battles continue.

Transnistria — there was no information about an additional aggravation of the situation. The threat of invasion remains relevant and will remain so until the Russian troops break through to the region.

Finally, systemic (not one-time “acts of intimidation”, but at a real violation of the railway network) missile strikes on the communications of so-called “Ukraine” began.

At the same time, I cannot fail to note that key objects — bridges and bridge aqueducts – are still bypassed by blows. The main emphasis is on the destruction of electrical substations that feed the lines. However, I have the honor to remind you (if suddenly the General Staff does not know) that Kyiv has a not-so-small fleet of diesel locomotives at its disposal (part of the railway lines in western Ukraine were not electrified even in Soviet times). And for them, damage to electricity supply systems is unpleasant, but not critical.

In general, the situation at the front continues to develop according to my (a week ago) forecast. Strategically, it plays into the hands of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which managed to prevent the widely advertised breakthrough of the front in the Donbass at almost the same positions from which the attempted breakthrough began (for now, at least).

The Armed Forces of Ukraine won another week to replenish troops, regroup and prepare reserves. And also for planning probable offensive operations where they are expected (Transnistria, for example) and where they are not expected. The Russian Command for some reason remains confident (despite all the “lessons” of the previous two months) that the enemy will fight in such a way that will be convenient to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Brigade is the strength of 2 to 4 BTG
  1. SteveK9 says

    If Russia began a (partial at least) mobilization, how long would it take to make a difference?

  2. guest says

    It is understandable why Strelkov Girkin is not part of the Russian military —they don’t want him, he doesn’t want them.
    He has been talking like this since the middle of March —gives the impression that he, too, expected the Army of Liberation to take Ukraine in one week.
    His predictions were realistic, not “pessimistic”

    The real war-aim on the North Shore ?

    1. Juan says

      The problem is, this guy noticed the opoortunity in 2014, the russian leadership rebuffed it, at a tremendous cost. This HAD to be solved in 2014, at whatever the cost, it would have been ay less than now. And they HAD the info to foresee this situation!!! No excuses, Strelkov was RIGHT then.

  3. guest says

    The structural problems of the Russian Armed Forces in 1905 and in 1914, all over, again.
    How the army group near Kiev defeated itself.
    These Russian troopers were deployed near Kiev. The Ukrainian forces more than decimated them. Why ?

    a) because they were deployed against the wrong enemy —an enemy that was more suited for that particular battle, better equipped, better supplied/supported
    b) the Russian troopers quickly became very determined fighters —self-preservation does that— but they were let down by the division-command; no supply, no support what-so-ever. They quickly got the feeling that the management doesn’t care about them, that they were left there to be slaughtered.

    What was left of them, were withdrawn at the end of March. Now they were in White Russia, and they had no intention of going back to the killing-field. Why ? Because they got the feeling that supply & support wouldn’t be any better this time; because they felt that once again they would be deployed in the wrong place, at the wrong time, against the wrong enemy; because they felt they would be sent to a killing-field, to be offered up as a blood-sacrifice (to some god of the high-command & the siloviki enforcers).

    Many of them refused to go. It is not a “war” it is not desertion. They are contractors, they can refuse the contract. They won’t get paid, they won’t get another contract, but they are not dead heroes, either. (what good is a free apartment and a bonus cheque if you are dead)

    Does General Dvornikov treat Russian soldiers any better than Grand-Duke Nicholas did ?
    Has Mr. Dvornikov, very good at demolishing cities, implemented any change in the mindset of the high-command ? Do soldiers of the Donetsk Army Group feel any different about their prospect and about their colonels and generals ?

  4. guest says

    Strelkov Girkin

    Strelkov Girkin thinks some sneaky underhanded horse-trading is going on behind the scenes between Moskva and Kiev over Trans-Nistria and the Azov Steelmill in Mariupol.

    Strelkov Girkin is concerned about the bridge connecting Crimea to Russia.
    The voicing of his concern caused loss of sleep among the citizens of Crimea.

    1. Juan says

      The links are blatant BS ukrop propaganda, but they have some useful info if you know how to filter the BS.

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