A State That Spends Under 5% of GDP on a Big War Is Not Serious About Said War
"And expectations have to be adjusted accordingly"
Source: Anatoly Karlin
Russia is withdrawing from Kherson.
While Z sphere & Russian patriotic Telegram copes, I just view it as a belated recognition that the kremlins are not fighting the war seriously, and war aims need to be pared down correspondingly.
UKRAINE RUSSIA WAR #PREDICTION
I think it's likelier than not that Kherson reverts to Ukraine by EOM January 2023. Not high conviction call but multiplicity of evidence now points to that.
Main focus will be on preserving the one Pyrrhic gain from the war, the Crimean Corridor.
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) November 6, 2022
This is what I wrote in another channel.
TLDR, if Russians couldn’t defeat Ukraine when they had massive materiel superiority, that’s certainly not happening now; not when kremlins are either ideologically or organizationally incapable of implementing a war economy.
Basically none of the ideas I suggested for ways to defeat Ukraine now that they dithered for half a year sees any signs of being adopted. Clear now that Kalibr strikes carry a coercive nature, as they’re not on the scale needed to suppress electric grid.
UKRAINE WAR UPDATE
I have identified four intertwining paths to victory for Russia:
(1) Mobilization ✅
(2) Massed Kalibr strikes on power infrastructure ✅
(3) Weaponized Kesslerization 🚀🪨🛰️💥
(4) Large-scale Chinese aid (🐉,🐻)
Let's go through them.https://t.co/IwwrHWhCdG
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) October 10, 2022
For whatever reason, they’re not serious about sourcing necessary supplies from China (not even just heavy weaponry, which might have been refused, but things like first aid kits, etc.). Astounding, much of the provision has actually been left to the regions.
In effect, as with COVID, the federal center devolving a core state responsibility to sub-polities that vary widely in their level of wealth and conscientiousness (and on a separate note setting up any number of problems for the post-war era).
But those are all details, at the end of the day, a state that spends ≤5% of GDP on a big war is not serious about said war, and expectations have to be adjusted accordingly; namely, hanging on to the Crimean Corridor and eventually forcing negotiations.
RUSSIA UKRAINE WAR MILITARY SPENDING
So just to continue because it's so shocking and frankly the single biggest blackpill wrt Russia's prospects.
The one consistent thing about wars is that they were generally won by the countries or coalitions with the bigger GDPs. https://t.co/T7Q0kWVpyI
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) November 5, 2022
Losing Izyum and Kherson were my two pre-stated conditions for considering that Russia is losing the war, and both have been fulfilled. Former rules out Slavyansk and Kharkov. Latter, even more decisively, rules out Nikolaev and Odessa.
On a more general level, I would say that it is the loss of Kherson and Izyum that would tilt me towards assessing that Russia has lost the Ukraine War more likely than not. You can bookmark this BTW.
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) September 9, 2022
And no amount of idiotic copium – MAGA cutting Ukrainian aid (stillborn anyway), shivering europoors throwing in the towel (German gas tanks are full), Belorussian front, Ukraine’s depopulation (de facto turning it into an armed camp), more anti-gay laws – is going to alter that.
So short of Ukrainians/Westerners losing a standard deviation or two of IQ to converge with the kremlins, or China opening a Pacific front (not necessarily that even that will be relevant if there’s no war economy), there’s just two actually *realistic* scenarios going forwards.
Russian “Pyrrhic victory” with the frontline (as initially predicted by @shanggyangg this March) encompassing the LDNR and the Crimean Corridor, but not Kherson — abandoning which is at least good step to increasing the likelihood of that happening.
a guess pic.twitter.com/mvETaAHtWz
— письма из берлоги (@shanggyangg) March 6, 2022
- Veterans freed up from Kherson and new mobiks used to reinforce Crimean Corridor.
- Focus on fortification, re-equipment, training, and preparing for upcoming Ukrainian surprises – ATACMS, fighters, drone swarms – which are likely to appear by summer.
The Crimean Corridor obviously has to hold. Without it, the Crimean Bridge is cooked as well, and Crimea’s fall becomes a matter of time at that point. (BTW, a schizo scenario in which Crimea falls, but urban LDNR with tight logistics ties to Russia holds, is not impossible).
The alternative is that the kremlins figure that one mobilization wave is enough; deplete existing manpower with costly frontal assaults on podunk villages; continue to run a peacetime economy and not think ahead.
Ukrs can potentially have 100s of these, maybe 1000s if Poland and Co. help out, by next summer. https://t.co/iazk2DxdsL Are kremlins coordinating with design bureaus, factories? (e.g. mating Shilkas with AI). Or gaming, considering, even just imagining such a scenario at all?
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) November 3, 2022
In that case, it simply cannot be logically excluded that the Ukrs sweep away this depleted army in early summer 2023, occupy the Crimean Corridor, besiege Crimea; kremlins order another mobilization in panic, but who would even cooperate with such losers at that point.
Regarding nukes: If you treat this as a colonial type war by spending ≤5% of GDP on it, and flip flop on decision day to day like the whole grain deal saga, all these threats are meaningless and will not be acted on. So Crimea at any rate will be doomed.
Idea I heard today: Real blackpill is that kremlins mentally think of this war like the ones in Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria, which they won; and have also seen American lose a couple of, in Iraq and Afghanistan; and consider to be no big deal, even if worse comes to worst.
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) November 9, 2022
Now whatever the kremlins themselves might think — and in this respect, the planned surge in spending on domestic security/police, while there are ostensibly much more pressing military demands, is quite foreboding:
Rather doubt 40% surge to 5.0T rubles (=$80B) is enough to win the war.
Projection of police/security spending rising much faster than military spending suggests they foresee more people needing batons to the face from next year.
Considering the above, presumably not in Kiev.
— Anatoly Karlin 🐘 (@powerfultakes) November 3, 2022
…the regime will not survive a lost war. I am very sure about this and have said this from Day One. In this scenario, Putin (or whoever he might try to push forwards as a replacement President) in 2024 would be toast.
Obviously my preference is for the whitepill over the blackpill scenario, but kremlin decision-making has surprised so starkly to the downside that the latter one will not surprise me. Hence why I’m not making any predictions on this matter now.